Three major obstacles

The wrangling between Washington and Pyongyang on petty issues is evidence of their deep-rooted suspicion of each other. Actually, three major factors underlie the approaches they tend to adopt in the negotiations and at other times: their historical animosity, conflicting political strategies and respective concerns over security in the future.

North Korea and the United States have yet to put their war to a formal end and are still anxious to beat their enemy. The relationship between the United States and North Korea after the Cold War features a continuation of the war. The North Korean regime, in particular, is under the lingering threat of the United States. In this sense, North Korea's nuclear ambition is derived from the hostile relations between the two countries.

As a matter of fact, the United States first introduced nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula. Many of its policies toward North Korea, such as economic and financial sanctions, encouraging defectors and regular large-scale military exercises directed at North Korea, have caused a "sub-war." The persistent hostility complicates their problems, making it difficult for them to bid farewell to their confrontational history.

Apart from their historical enmity, the two countries are embroiled in political and strategic conflicts. One of the major components of the U.S. global strategy after the Cold War is to promote "democracy." After the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the Bush administration sought to achieve its goal by military force with a preemptive strategy. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently directed criticisms at this trend, exposing the downside of the U.S. global political strategy. The United States has not only labeled North Korea part of an "axis of evil" and an "outpost of tyranny," but also sent tangible signals of a military threat.

North Korea failed to adjust its development strategies at the end of the Cold War because of the U.S. interference on the grounds of the nuclear issue and other hindrances. When it started to pursue economic reforms in the new century, the United States largely deprived the country of its opportunities. North Korea has no choice but to maneuver with the United States through various means. At home, it prepares for a possible military showdown with its "military-first" policy, which of course dictates the development of nuclear weapons. On the international stage, however, it tries to negotiate with parties concerned to resolve the crisis peacefully.

The complex conflicts between the United States and North Korea have given rise to security concerns. The United States is mainly concerned that North Korea may spread nuclear technology or materials to terrorists and that the development of nuclear technology in North Korea may threaten its interests in the Pacific region. North Korea, for its part, is concerned about possible U.S. military attacks and non-military subversion. Nuclear weapons not only are a counterbalance to U.S. military threats but can also help enhance the nation's solidarity.

Denuclearization is the last resort for North Korea to have the United States dump its hostile policies. It hopes to trade for a solution to all problems with a promise to abandon its nuclear programs. That's why it tends to raise its demands in the negotiations, even on petty issues. As it is unsure about whether its concessions can lead to the fulfillment of its ultimate goal, North Korea needs tangible benefits given with each step it takes.

The United States believes that denuclearization of North Korea is its lowest aim. It may sign a peace agreement with a nuclear-free North Korea, but is not willing to provide large economic compensation to the country, still less to withdraw its troops from the Korean Peninsula, in exchange for North Korea's abandonment of its nuclear programs. In fact, many of North Korea's demands bear on the U.S. global strategy. Even Americans themselves are not sure to what extent they can compromise. That's why the Bush administration refused to make any concessions in the beginning.

In this context, the real challenge facing the six-party talks is how to define its end and means. The joint statement of the fourth round of the talks affirmed that the goal of the six-party talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, while classifying lasting peace and stability on the peninsula as an auxiliary goal or as bait to bring about the denuclearization of North Korea. This definition has made the six-party talks confounding to many people. Also, in order to make negotiations possible, the parties often begin with less contentious issues, an approach that makes the aim of the talks even more obscure. Worse still, attempts to use this approach to improve mutual trust between the United States and North Korea may result in more contention on petty issues such as the one the parties encountered in the most recent talks.

The six-party talks should focus on the normalization of Washington-Pyongyang relations and peace in Northeast Asia, if we recognize that the reason the United States and North Korea have yet to legally end their war-they are still at a "sub-war"-is the root cause of the Korean nuclear issue. Arms will not be dropped before peace becomes the ultimate goal.