STRONG ARMS: The U.S. decision to sell weapons to Taiwan, including Patriot III anti-missile systems shown in this file photo, is politically motivated (XINHUA/AFP)

The Pentagon announced on January 6 the United States would sell weapons with a total value of nearly $1 billion, mainly Patriot III anti-missile systems, to Taiwan. The Chinese Government strongly denounced the move, adopting a much tougher stance than it had previously done.

This event cast a shadow over Sino-U.S. relations once again, less than two months after U.S. President Barack Obama's first state visit to China, which brought a honeymoon period to the two countries.

At the end of 2009, analysts predicted a possible cooling in Sino-U.S. relations during 2010 because of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Obama's planed meeting with the Dalai Lama and trade disputes. Their concerns have now become a reality.

Obama's real purpose

The U.S. Government said the sales plan was part of the arms sales package unveiled in October 2008 under the Bush administration, and reiterated the defensive nature of Patriot III anti-missile systems. It also argued arms sales to Taiwan were an obligation under its Taiwan Relations Act.

The economic benefits of the arms sales seem to be the direct reason. The large order provided by Taiwan is attractive to the United States in the context of the global financial crisis. Nevertheless, the crisis-ridden country needs help more from the Chinese mainland. Compared to what the vast market on the Chinese mainland can offer, economic benefits brought by the arms sales to Taiwan are negligible.

Washington's political purposes outweigh economic considerations. For a long time, it has taken selling arms to Taiwan as an indication of U.S. policy of treating the island as an independent political entity. It has also used this means mainly to develop military relations with the Taiwan authorities.

Maintaining the military balance across the Taiwan Straits has long been the U.S. excuse for its arms sales. But its real purpose is to make Taiwan a long-term geopolitical card to constrain China's development.

In order to realize this purpose, the United States has to ensure Taiwan is in a state of "neither reunification nor independence" so as to maintain its ability to intervene in Taiwan's political affairs and cross-Straits relations.

Seeing the thriving development of cross-Straits exchanges in 2009, the United States felt its influence on Taiwan had declined. It even began to worry about the risk of being kicked out of the game.

Against this backdrop, the Americans re-launched arms sales to Taiwan. In this way, they attempted not only to strengthen their political influence in Taiwan, but also to impede the process of peaceful reunification across the Taiwan Straits. What's more, the United States could incorporate Taiwan in the U.S.-dominated East Asian missile defense system.

On top of these motives, as Obama's influence in U.S. politics falters, his ability to maintain the stability of Sino-U.S. relations has also weakened.

From the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, one can conclude both cooperation and disputes exist between China and the United States. But they also show Washington's China policy is two-sided.

On one hand, it actively seeks cooperation with China in some fields while, on the other, it is adopting a containment strategy against China in fields including human rights, the Taiwan question, arms sales and trade.

In this sense, the latest arms sales are actually a political adventure and a strategic probe against the Chinese Government.

Responding strongly

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been bothering Sino-U.S. relations for a long time.

According to statistics, arms and other military aid presented and sold by the United States to Taiwan reached more than $10 billion between 1950 and 1978.

To solve the problem, China and the United States signed the August 17 Communiqué in 1982, three years after they established diplomatic relations.

In the communiqué, the United States pledged "its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution."

But the U.S. Government has never carried out the August 17 Communiqué whole-heartedly. On the contrary, it has escalated arms sales in both quantity and quality.

The Chinese Government has always opposed this. It has urged the United States to strictly abide by the principles of the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués—especially the August 17 Communiqué—and stop arms sales to Taiwan. But the United States has not made any changes in the face of China's protests.

China has responded to the new round of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan with an unprecedented tough attitude for a number of reasons.

First, the action of the United States infringes on the core interests of China and goes against international law.

More than three decades after it adopted its reform and opening-up policy, China has become an international power familiar with the international politics and is able to conduct modern diplomacy flexibly via various channels.

It has upheld two principles in its contacts with other countries: the first is if two countries want to work together, they should take care of each other's core interests; and the second is once two countries create a legally binding document, they should fulfill their respective obligations in accordance with the provisions of the document.

A country may have many national interests. These interests can be divided into different levels according to their degree of importance. Only a few are defined as "core interests."

In its diplomatic decision-making, the Chinese Government has tried to avoid the generalization of its core national interests by taking a prudent approach toward defining them.

But it has clearly classified the Taiwan question as an issue at its core national interests. Washington's respect on this question has therefore been the key to the sound development of Sino-U.S. relations in recent years.

The three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués have always been the cornerstone of Sino-U.S. relations. China—its government and people—does not accept the Taiwan Relations Act the U.S. Congress passed in 1979 after the establishment of China-U.S. diplomatic relations. And they strongly oppose the U.S. practice of placing the Taiwan Relations Act above the August 17 Communiqué.

In addition to the changes in China's perception of its own national interests and international law, the rise of the influence of public opinion at home is another reason.

With its extraordinary growth in the past three decades, China's political leadership structure has gradually changed. The previous structure featuring a strong state and a weak society has been replaced by one characterized by a strong state coupled with a fledging civil society. Social forces now have a bigger influence on the government's decision-making than ever before.

For instance, China's 384 million Internet users have grown to become a new force in the arena of public opinion. As a result, diplomatic decision makers must respect and listen to public opinion—a trend that has become increasingly prominent given the rapid progress of globalization today.

Last but not least, with the constant enhancement of China's overall strength, the current balance of power between China and the United States is quite different from what it was 10 years ago.

Given the profound impact of the world financial crisis and accelerating multi-polarization, America's dream of dominating the world as the only superpower has become impossible. Despite the crisis, China has maintained rapid economic growth, and its international influence has further strengthened.

Managing crisis

Looking back on 2009, Sino-U.S. relations enjoyed a good beginning after Obama took office. But the three bombs that can explode any time—arms sales to Taiwan, Obama's meeting with the Dalai Lama and trade disputes—have yet to be resolved.

The Associated Press reported on January 25 that the Obama administration has decided to sell new weapons to Taiwan. An official announcement of the sale, which is likely to include Black Hawk helicopters, Patriot III missiles and military communications equipment, could come soon, according to the report.

Although these issues may adversely affect Sino-U.S. relations, they can be kept under control, because of the multiple common interests and developed cooperation mechanisms between the two countries.

Most importantly, both governments have the strong desire to solve problems and promote cooperation.

All in all, in 2010, Sino-U.S. relations may undergo fluctuations and will not be as good as in 2009. But the broad framework of the relationship will not change. Dialogue and cooperation will remain the mainstream.

The most recent arms sales have once again awakened China to the importance of the August 17 Communiqué. In the future, it will be more determined to urge the United States to honor its commitments in the communiqué. It is expected to make a substantive counterattack against every sale of arms. The United States will have to pay more dearly every time until it finally stops arms sales to Taiwan and faithfully implements the August 17 Communiqué.

Jin Canrong is a professor with the School of International Studies at Renmin University of China. Dong Chunling is a postgraduate student at the school