Both Koizumi and the DPJ focused on the need to loosen the bureaucracy's grip on the levers of government. In 2005, postal savings reform became the emblem of smaller government for the Koizumi cabinet, and Japanese citizens were asked if they really wanted hundreds of thousands of bureaucrats deciding their lives for them. Likewise, today, the DPJ campaigned on similar premises: Government is too big, and the bureaucrats too unaccountable. Bashing the bureaucrats and claiming a direct role in representing Japan's citizens are the new mantra in Japanese politics.

But a longer-term question is how to create the broader institutions that will sustain governance as Japan moves toward alternating political power. The herculean task of building a serious second party seems to have paid off. A difficult time lies ahead if a more predictable and stable relationship—one that protects the bureaucrats from petty politics and one that empowers the politicians in policymaking—cannot be defined. At the heart of the matter, however, will be the free and open debate of ideas. At all levels of Japanese society, such a debate will sustain Japan's political transformation.

Diplomatic impact

Changes in governance practices will affect Japan's foreign policy. The DPJ argues for a more "equal" relationship with the United States, and this is a sentiment shared by many in Japan. More specifically, the DPJ has taken issue with how U.S. forces on Japanese soil are managed. They have called for a review in policies such as host nation support and a review of the Status of Forces Agreement with the United States.

The DPJ has also suggested it would end the refueling mission that its Maritime Self-Defense Force conducts in the Indian Ocean and amend the current plan to realign U.S. forces in Okinawa. More recently, party leaders have suggested the need to reconsider how U.S. nuclear forces would be allowed to operate in and around Japan.

Another key foreign policy difference from the ruling LDP is the relationship with Japan's neighbors in Northeast Asia. The DPJ suggests the need to put greater emphasis on these relationships in Japan's overall diplomatic effort, but the real change suggested by DPJ leaders is in addressing more squarely the legacies of Japan's World War II history.

Finally, the two parties differ in their interpretations of Japan's Constitution and on how that affects Japan's role in international politics. Although some differences exist within the DPJ, there is less enthusiasm for the use of Japan's postwar military as an instrument of international cooperation unless explicitly sanctioned by the UN Security Council.

The Obama administration will need to be patient. Political transitions take time, and Washington does not have much experience with the Japanese version. It will take the new DPJ government time to refine its foreign policy priorities. Likewise, it will be important for the DPJ to articulate the areas in which it wants to work with Washington. To date, it is only the DPJ's critiques of past alliance management practices that have garnered attention.

Several issues will require immediate attention. The first is the ongoing effort to develop a regional approach to containing North Korea's efforts at nuclear proliferation. UN sanctions continue to put pressure on Pyongyang, but the longer-term task of denuclearization remains. A second ongoing challenge for Tokyo and Washington is the G20 effort to resuscitate the global economy. Japan's own economic recovery will be indispensable, but its continued activism in the area of global financial reform is also important.

Finally, the UN-sponsored climate change summit in September and the Copenhagen convention in December suggest that Tokyo and Washington have much to gain from working more closely on climate change and energy issues. Japan's own technological advantage in this area, as well as its record of achievement in energy conservation, should provide ample opportunities for collaboration with the Obama administration.

Challenges ahead

The outcome of this election will not end Japan's effort at political reform, but it will usher in a new phase. With its victory at the poll, DPJ's success or failure at governance will have future electoral consequences. Several more elections will be required if Japan is to have a viable system for the regular transfer of power. Until the next Upper House election in 2010, the DPJ will have to tread carefully to sustain the coalition that allows it to shape that legislative body's views. Finally, just as the DPJ will need to become accustomed to governing, the LDP will need to become accustomed to being the party out of power.

This may sorely test the Japanese public's patience, but it will also test the patience of those outside Japan. Japan's laborious process of political transformation seems out of sync with the increasingly harsh pacing of global events. The ability to generate options for Japan, and the capacity to translate ideas into policy, will be key requirements for Japan's political leaders in the days and months ahead. But their most difficult challenges may not be found within. Rather, Japan's new government may find itself severely tested by events abroad, and thus it would do well to work quickly to develop the global and regional relationships that will sustain its vision of Japan's future.

The author is a senior fellow for Japan studies at the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations. Her article was originally published at www.cfr.org