China has signed all international nonproliferation treaties, including a number of agreements with the IAEA. In 1988, China signed an agreement with the IAEA subjecting a number of facilities in China to IAEA safeguards. In addition, China further declared that it would report to the IAEA any export or import of nuclear materials and all exports of nuclear equipment.

What is China's evaluation of the IAEA's inspection work in Iraq, Iran and North Korea?

The IAEA, together with UNMOVIC, the UN body responsible for the monitoring, verification and inspection of Iraqi proscribed weapon stockpiles and programs, conducted a thorough inspection in Iraq. Before the coalition army started the Iraq war in 2003, both organizations reported to the UN Security Council that they did not find any proof that Iraq maintained any stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. It now has been proven that the conclusions made by the two organizations are correct and that their inspections have been effective.

With regard to the cases of Iran and the DPRK, the situations are different from that of Iraq. For Iraq, there was UN Security Council Resolution 687, under which Iraq was obliged to declare and destroy all its proscribed weapons. The IAEA and UNMOVIC could in theory go to Iraq and conduct inspections anytime, anywhere.

Right now, the IAEA does not have a mandate similar to the one in Iraq. It may initiate an ordinary inspection mission to Iran and the DPRK, as it does to any other NPT members. That is to say, it may only inspect those sites declared by the country concerned.

The effectiveness of the IAEA's inspection depends on multiple factors and it is still too early to predict the result at this stage. The cooperation of the country being inspected is of crucial importance.

What is your expectation of the IAEA's work in North Korea?

Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the IAEA, recently traveled to the DPRK. Before that, DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan went on a tour to the United States and met with the head of the U.S. delegation to the six-party talks. These are important steps taken by the parties concerned to take initial steps for improving their relations and for implementing the joint statement of the six-party talks.

The Korean nuclear issue is a complex one. The success of the IAEA's work in the DPRK also relates to other issues, such as the normalization of bilateral relations with the United States, Japan and South Korea. The DPRK has expressed its willingness to achieve a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. In exchange, it wishes to gain diplomatic recognition, security assurance, financial and energy assistance, as well as a guarantee from the United States not to engage in any activities aimed at destabilizing the country. Japan, on the other hand, has its own considerations. It puts the resolution of the kidnapped Japanese citizens on the top of its agenda and is reluctant to discuss the provision of substantive assistance before the settlement of its own concerns.

I would not be surprised if the road toward a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula encounters twists and turns.

As an expert on nonproliferation, can you tell us how to distinguish the difference between peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and developing nuclear weapons? Is there a clear line between this? Who can tell?

In the foreseeable future, nuclear energy is possibly the only energy we can expect as substitute for oil. The demand for the peaceful use of nuclear energy is growing rapidly.

Technically, it is not entirely impossible to make a judgment on the actual intention of a country's nuclear activity. The IAEA and the international community have devised a set of methods to detect any transfer of equipment and materials from peaceful use to weapon purpose.

However, nuclear technology for civilian and military purposes is closely linked. Much of the equipment and material used is dual-use in nature. This makes distinguishing between the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the development of nuclear weapons difficult. Many countries have nuclear power plants and have the knowledge and capability to produce and enrich fissile materials that can be used for the production of nuclear weapons.

As I said earlier, there are countries that choose to stay away from the NPT and are immune to IAEA inspections. Moreover, the IAEA cannot go to a member state to launch an inspection mission anytime, anywhere.

In conclusion, the prevention of nuclear proliferation is more a question of political will rather than one of a technical nature.