North Korean Prime Minister Kim Yong Il's recent visits to several Southeast Asian countries caught the attention of foreign affairs analysts worldwide. His first stop was Viet Nam. He arrived in Hanoi on October 26 and met with his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Tan Dung the next day. During their meeting, Kim signed a memorandum on bilateral communication in science, technology, agriculture and culture.

After that, Kim talked with General Secretary of the Communist Party of Viet Nam Nong Duc Manh and Vietnamese President Nguyen Minh Triet. During his Viet Nam tour, he also visited the department that oversees the country's foreign investment and economic opening up. Observers believed that the real mission of the North Korean prime minister was to make preparations for the country's top leader Kim Jong Il's future tour to Viet Nam.

Kim Yong Il flew from Viet Nam to Kuala Lumpur on October 30. The next day he went to Cambodia and later to Laos. He spent three to four days in each country, devoting most of his time to visiting the countries' economic departments, exchanging views and signing cooperation agreements with host leaders.

Kim's visit was noteworthy for two reasons. First, Kim, known for his "technical style," was diligent but relaxed during his busy schedule. Before that, North Korean officials used to be very serious and secretive during their diplomatic visits. Observers tried to read into his behavior. Second, Kim's tour was part of North Korea's "all-around diplomacy" program that started earlier this year and is known as "North Korea hugs the world."

In March, Kim Jong Il paid a surprise visit to the Chinese Embassy in North Korea and celebrated China's traditional Lantern Festival with the Chinese staff there. Meanwhile, Kim dispatched his Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan to the United States to discuss the normalization of U.S.-North Korean relations with Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Bush administration's envoy to the six-party talks. He also extended an invitation to U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Kim also invited European Union and Australian representatives to Pyongyang.

In April, North Korea resumed its diplomatic relations with Myanmar, which it cut off 24 years ago. North Korea submitted its defense and security situation report to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for the first time in May. Two months later, North Korea's high-ranking leader Kim Jong Nam kicked off a tour to five countries in Asia and Africa.

There was a breakthrough in the relationship between North Korea and South Korea in August, with the former agreeing to hold another summit meeting with the latter-the first one in seven years. In September, North Korea established diplomatic relations with five other countries including Guatemala. When General Secretary of the Communist Party of Viet Nam Nong Duc Manh visited North Korea in October, Kim Jong Il welcomed him in person at the airport.

Hugs, but no kisses

When analyzing North Korea's recent diplomatic flurry, one can perhaps determine why the country suddenly decided to "hug the world." Since early this year, North Korea has focused on its economic development. The country's mainstream newspapers have published many articles on its economic development. Kim Jong Il also noted during one of his inspection tours throughout the country that 2007 should be a turning point in North Korea's economic development. On October 23, Rodong Sinmun, the newspaper of the Workers' Party of Korea, published an editorial about North Korea's struggle to become a major economic power. But North Korea clearly has refused economic reform and opening-up policies in all forms. One North Korean leader said the idea of following specific steps to open the country's economy would be a "daydream." It is obvious that North Korea's "hugging the world" policy is definitely not a scenario that involves an opening-up policy. Such a hypothesis is not practical, because it ignores the background of North Korea's nuclear test last October and UN Resolution 1718, which aims to punish North Korea with sanctions.

The People's Korea, a newspaper based in Japan that always reflects the North Korean Government's stance, issued an authoritative explanation. In its report on October 30, it said that North Korea's nuclear test last October, the February 13 Agreement and the summit meetings between the North and South, were all achievements made under Kim Jong Il's wise leadership and were all connected to the process of readjusting Northeast Asian relations.

Owning nuclear weapons is not just a tactic, but also a strategy that North Korea will stick to at any price for decades to come. The goal of this strategy is to readjust regional relations in Northeast Asia. Last October, North Korea conducted its nuclear weapons test despite world protests, and then announced that it was a "nuclear state." With the test, North Korea's goal now has switched from producing nuclear weapons to protecting nuclear weapons. According to Resolution 1718, North Korea has three top missions to fulfill in light of UN sanctions: first, to avoid punishment from the United States in the form of UN sanctions; second, to get rid of Resolution 1718; and third, to work toward the target of establishing diplomatic relations with the United States under the precondition that North Korea owns nuclear capabilities and that the international community acknowledges it as a nuclear state.

North Korea has almost fulfilled the first goal. Although the draft of Resolution 1718 submitted by the United States hinted at the possibility of a military punishment for North Korea, the approved resolution terms cover only political and economic sanctions due to China's peaceful stance. Since North Korea returned to the negotiation table at the six-party talks and signed the agreement, it is immune from any further and tougher decisions of the UN.

North Korea is also fulfilling its second goal. The UN Security Council bans all members from exporting heavy weapons, related equipment technology, luxuries and capital. Meanwhile, workers and their families involved with the production of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction are forbidden from entering North Korea. To break up these sanctions, North Korea is planning some step-by-step diplomatic actions.

Attracted to North Korea's trade opportunities, foreign business people are continuing to go to the country, which enables foreign trade to be the first step out of a nuclear winter. Moreover, to ease relations on the Korean Peninsula and work toward the Korean nation's unity, North Korea improved its relationship with South Korea, agreed to hold the summit meeting, strengthened its bilateral economic cooperation and permitted South Korea's capital to flow into North Korea.

North Korea also is making progress on its third goal. After its nuclear weapons test, U.S. President George W. Bush called for restraining North Korea from nuclear proliferation, instead of America's old call for preventing North Korea from owning nuclear weapons. The United States acknowledged that it was not realistic to require a country that had conducted a test to abandon nuclear weapons. North Korea got America's signal, adjusted its diplomatic policy and strengthened its ties with the United States. Kim Gye Gwan and Christopher Hill's frank, flexible but efficient discussion also reflected this tendency.

Therefore, we can see that North Korea's active diplomatic moves are part of the country's whole nuclear strategy. In spite of seeking economic profits through international cooperation, the country's biggest target is to break up the sanctions of Resolution 1718 and maintain its nuclear state position. The North Korean media's ambitious editorials on the anniversary of its nuclear weapons test prove this point. A professor from South Korea's Korean University was even more practical. He said that during Kim Yong Il's visit to Viet Nam, the North Korean leader seemed to try to learn from the Vietnamese, who were also rivals of the United States, how to improve relations with the United States.

(The viewpoint of the article does not necessarily represent that of Beijing Review)

The author is a professor with the Institute of International Strategic Research at the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China