President Obama's visit to Beijing in November marked a major diplomatic milestone in his first year in office. The wide range of issues discussed illustrate the depth and breadth of the bilateral relationship, making this perhaps the first meeting between the two countries' leaders where global issues dominated the agenda. However, President Obama is not taking the path of least resistance as he seeks to build the U.S.-China relationship, evidenced by decidedly negative portrayals of his visit in major U.S. newspapers. He is taking a high-risk, low-profile approach that seeks long-term gains for U.S. interests at the expense of attaining "quick wins" that potentially alienate China and reduce the likelihood of Beijing's cooperation on major issues. This approach is of high risk for the president because it potentially displeases some of his important domestic constituencies who might like to see him press more visibly on key issues such as human rights. U.S. organized labor groups are also looking for concrete actions to protect American jobs, reduce the trade deficit and roll back China's successful industrial protection and import substitution policies. Obama's low-key strategy entails a commitment to frequent dialogues with the expectation that incremental progress will be made over the long term.

Consistent with the "comprehensive" approach to U.S.-China relations, this low-profile, high-risk strategy is being applied not only to economic issues, but strategic security challenges as well. There is a great sense of urgency in the United States about North Korea's and Iran's nuclear aspirations and the threat of regional instability each poses. But many Western observers feel China does not share these concerns or their sense of urgency, and chooses instead to protect both countries from UN sanctions and make significant investments and trade deals that empower Tehran and Pyongyang. On North Korea and Iran, Obama's strategy is high-risk because he is not directly confronting China or "delivering" high-profile results that satisfy critics and preempt accusations Obama is not taking a firm stand. To overcome this, the White House has to communicate tactfully the low-profile achievements that will contribute to finding durable solutions to these difficult problems, such as carefully lining up Chinese support for U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth's visit to Pyongyang and gaining North Korea's willingness to return to the six-party talks. Of course, the six-party talks in and of themselves do not signal the resolution of the issue, but they are a step in the direction toward denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Similarly on Iran, President Obama will have to elucidate his expectations of China's behavior and set objectives for U.S. engagement with China that will contribute to a multinational effort that ultimately leads to Iran's abandonment of its nuclear weapons program.

The atmospherics of the China-U.S. relationship are generally positive as engagement takes on a new importance. It is becoming increasingly apparent China is important to solving key global challenges and its rise needs to be accommodated so its expanding global footprint does not upset international norms or undermine architectures from which it has up to now benefited. The U.S. strategy presumes that to engage China effectively requires a veneer of affability which has so far proven relatively easy to maintain. However, the U.S. approach presumes China will take meaningful actions, not just rhetorical ones, to address key challenges, including climate change and non-proliferation.

The United States recognizes China is not ready to "take the lead" on international issues, but frustration will undoubtedly grow in the United States, both with China and President Obama's strategy, if China continues to support countries that undermine regional security or if Beijing refuses to take on greater responsibilities. President Obama risks being seen as coddling a free-riding China and will be increasingly pressured to try a different strategy. In the absence of results, giving face to China and treating it as an equal will be less palatable and the administration could be pressured to set up confrontational encounters with Chinese leaders. Should China not take meaningful action to address challenges, Beijing's global credibility will slip as well, for example, as with Gulf states if Beijing does not take a firmer stand with Iran, or Central Asian states if China does not contribute meaningfully to Afghan reconstruction. China will not be able to look indefinitely at challenges such as climate change, trade imbalances, Iran and North Korea and determine the impending threats are America's fault or problem while it pursues a course that sustains those threats, and seeks only to benefit itself at the expense of others.

In 2009 a novel strategy for a new president to build a more comprehensive, pragmatic relationship with China was introduced. But China cannot just sit back and bask in the abstract camaraderie and predictability now characterizing the China-U.S. relationship. For this to continue, China will have to "step up" in 2010, look beyond its domestic challenges, narrow national interest and begin to contribute to international efforts to solve global problems.

The author is director of China Studies and Starr Senior Fellow at The Nixon Center in Washington, D.C.