This encouraging figure means that China has billions of reasons to guard the safety of its sea lanes of communication (SLOCs). The first step is to guarantee the security of the Malacca Strait, which is the key passage from the South China Sea to the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean. About half the ships passing through the Malacca Strait are sailing to or from one of China's 1,400 ports. This strait, which is overcrowded and increasingly fragile, not only illustrates China's growth, but also exposes the country's deadly weakness. The strait could easily be closed or lose function, because there are too many opportunities for blockades from hostile nations, pirate attacks, manmade accidents and natural disasters. The question is not the possibility of danger, but the degree of severity.

Further away in the Indian Ocean, China has no territorial claims and can only participate in limited resource exploitation. China's interest is reflected only in sea lane security. At first glance, it would appear that the Indian Ocean is not as important as the East China Sea or South China Sea, because there is no involvement of nationalism or economic interests. But sea lane security represents not only short-term interests, but also a significant strategic security problem concerning the country's life or death in the 21st century.

The Chinese Navy has now entered the Indian Ocean for anti-piracy and escort missions, opening a new chapter in the naval history of the nation. But existing problems cast a shadow. Marine forces in the Indian Ocean are suspicious of China's presence. Besides, the Chinese Navy cannot guarantee the safety of Chinese commodity ships in the Indian Ocean, because its fleet has no logistics base and cannot sail for a long time.

No matter how much China desires a harmonious world and harmonious oceans, it cannot possibly rely on other countries' naval forces to guard the safety of its SLOCs. A big country that builds its prosperity on foreign trade cannot put the safety of its ocean fleet in the hands of other countries. Doing so would be the equivalent of placing its throat under another's dagger and marking its blood vessels in red ink.

Since China will inevitably continue to grow as a manufacturing and trading country, it can never take the safety of its Indian Ocean SLOCs too seriously. They are a lifeline that connects China with Europe, Africa and the Middle East.

Territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea may stir Chinese nationalism more easily, but China's interest in the Indian Ocean is at least of equal importance, and these interests do not contradict each other.

The best approach

China has extremely important strategic interests, and also faces severe security threats, in both oceans that Asia neighbors. China has many questions to think about in terms of how to realize its ocean interests and guarantee its maritime security. Should it build a blue-water navy and establish sea supremacy in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and even the Indian Ocean? Or should it take a more indirect but more efficient and economic approach, rethinking the relationship between sea power and land power while strengthening its naval forces?

The 19th century American naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that sea power is key to strong foreign policy. But his theory is not comprehensive, and sea power does not just mean absolute dominance of the oceans. It actually consists of several levels and intersects with various ocean interests. The lowest level of sea power is realizing efficient control of territorial waters. The next level is guaranteeing the safety of SLOCs. The next level after that is obtaining the navy's free movement at sea. The highest level is maritime supremacy in accordance with Mahan's theory. Both the latter levels normally require a powerful naval force. But free movement does not have to constrict other naval forces, and absolute maritime supremacy denies other navies' access to the target area and destroys them when necessary. In fact, currently no country except the United States could impose Mahan's theory of maritime supremacy in any ocean.

If measured in accordance with traditional Mahan theory, there is no doubt that China's strategic interests are opposed to those of any country that has a strong naval presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Sea power requires different input at different levels, which has different geopolitical consequences. China will definitely provoke conflict if it seeks maritime supremacy to the exclusion of other navies. But if China seeks free movement, the risks created can still be controlled. If China only wants to ensure the safety of its SLOCs, then there will be large space for international cooperation. Actually, considering that China's might and prosperity are based on its growing reliance on the outside world, the natural conclusion is that China would not possibly seek maritime supremacy or even free naval movement, because its foreign policy is targeted at creating a peaceful regional environment.

Therefore, China can best solve the Malacca security problem if it secures its SLOCs through regional and international cooperation, especially strategic cooperation with its all-weather friend Pakistan.

This does not mean that the same approach is suitable for territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea, which is why the Chinese military has been called on to construct a blue-water navy. Besides, even if China wants to cooperate with other countries at sea, it should have enough sea power to guarantee that the direction of any cooperation follows its will.