For China, the DPRK's continuing reliance on its aid, energy and support is evidently becoming wearing. Deng Xiaoping made it clear in the 1980s that it was crucial for China to enjoy a benign, stable and economically prosperous international environment in order for it to develop its internal capacity, and to build a modern industrial and knowledge-based economy. With this philosophy, China has built a remarkable series of positive relations with countries throughout the world, culminating in it entering the World Trade Organization in 2001, and largely fulfilling its obligations to open its markets by 2006. North Korea's ability to destabilize the region, particularly its potential impact on Japan and South Korea, is sources of anxiety. And an imploding North Korea, with large potential migrations of population, and knock-on effect on the northeast of China, would pose big challenges, both in dealing with it when it happened, and then in dealing with how to clean up afterward.

Here the international community is largely unified. The very specific economic and political decisions of the North Korean leadership in the last 40 years in particular have created a dead end. North Korea is largely seen as one of the final legacies of the Cold War, an era which, for everywhere else, was finished partly by President Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972, and then by the rapprochement between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s. It is an extraordinary anomaly to have the issue of the DPRK still so much alive, and so difficult to deal with, in the 21st century. But deal with it, one way or the other, the international community will have to.

The Bush and Obama administrations have, at least in their behavior, acknowledged that negotiations remain the sole path to dealing with this issue. President Clinton in 1994 had assessments made of the possible outcomes of military attack. They made for grim reading. Clinton's military advisors made clear that even a successful strike on the DPRK, because of its massive militarization, would result in over half a million casualties on the South Korean side. The impact of this in East Asia would potentially wipe out decades of positive growth. It would potentially create unnecessary opposition and conflict between countries not even directly involved in the action. It would destabilize the region, and the world. Military action therefore remains unthinkable.

For talks, however, the nuclearization of the DPRK has continued to pose a real problem. It has been a clear red line both for the United States, and other members of the six-party talks. North Korea's military, however, has been keen to get at least some capacity in this area. Its tests prove that they have partially succeeded. This new element changes the landscape dramatically. North Korea, with its failed, imploding economy, is in the unique position of also being a member of the elite nuclear club. This has only served to make it even more necessary to both deal with the DPRK, and to get some agreement from it. It has put the DPRK leadership in a good position, one which it has exploited.

There is little doubt that the current DPRK system is unsustainable. The question the international community now needs to address more and more is what to do about the DPRK, if and when the system breaks down. We now need a plan B. Does an international group work with whatever is left of the DPRK administration when it falls? How is its economy and capacity rebuilt after many years of failure? What are the specific roles of separate countries when they come to deal with this problem—or should there be one lead partner? They seem unthinkable problems at the moment, but they are all quite possible. The world should be prepared for any eventuality, especially concerning such a volatile, potentially destructive problem.

Before then, of course, there is a possibly very long and very rocky road. It certainly doesn't look easy. Clinton's visit at least draws to an end the recent very nasty and disruptive period. While there are no immediate plans to go back to the six-party talks, at least the Obama administration now has settled who the main officials will be to deal with this problem, providing some much needed consistency and attention.

For those around Kim Jong Il, the key issue is the very pragmatic one of regime survival. For them, however secret it might be, their minds must be straying to what happens when finally he goes. His three sons have all been mentioned as potential successors. No one really knows who will come out top in this succession process and how. But they will be leading a country, either in a coalition, or alone, where their mandate is even weaker than Kim's. They have all enjoyed foreign education, in Switzerland. Little is known about their outlook, but it is very unlikely that they can, or would want to, exercise power in the same way as their father. Looking at any clues about their beliefs and behavior over the coming months and years is going to be important.

The best outcome, however unlikely it looks now, is a DPRK that moderates its behavior, starts to reform its exhausted economy, and talks to the world more. The worst outcome is the sort of aggression seen earlier this year that escalates to a situation, either by accident or design, where confrontation leads to real conflict. China's role here, as the largest donor of energy and aid, is very important. It might not have many inducements to edge North Korea along, but whatever it has is more than the rest of the world. China may feel frequently let down and irritated by its "little brother's" behavior, but there is evidently still a very strong obligation felt by the larger country to the smaller country to help it temper its behavior and be more realistic in its foreign policy ambitions.

Kim Jong Il has surprised the world before. Perhaps, as he goes into the final period of his rule, he might seek a truly historic legacy, and offer some opening that will dramatically lessen the tensions along the 38th parallel and in the region. If he did, then just as much as Kim Dae Jung in 2002, he would merit a Nobel Prize for Peace. Very unlikely, but stranger things have happened. And when that happens, we can all sleep more safely in our beds.

(The view in this article does not necessarily represent that of Beijing Review.)

The author is a senior fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in Britain