Diplomatic direction

REACHING OUT TO EUROPE: Newly elected Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych (left) holds a press conference together with European Commission President José Manuel Barroso after their talks at the EU headquarters in Brussels on March 1 (XINHUA)

It would be folly at best to assert that a single election could alter Russia's weakening impact within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Nearly two decades since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, geopolitical pluralism has become a byword in the region.

As a result, Russia has been deprived of its role as the region's political leader to become one of the geopolitical actors. Nevertheless, while the policies of the United States and its EU allies have significantly changed the balance of power there, they still cannot surpass Russia's regional influence.

Ukraine now represents a key geopolitical pawn in the region—one that none of the major powers will likely abandon. Yanukovych is not likely to introduce dramatic changes to Ukraine's foreign policy. But we can expect to see minor shifts.

It is likely that Kiev will seek to repair its frayed relations with Russia. Generally speaking, it will be an amendment to the diplomatic pursuits of Yushchenko, who had attached far too much importance to ideology.

There is a saying that we can choose our own friends, but we cannot choose neighbors. Ukraine and Russia are neighbors with a long history of ethnic integration. And to properly handle relations with Russia is important, both for Ukraine's national unity and its energy supply.

Yanukovych comes from the eastern part of Ukraine, which has been influenced more by Moscow. His supporters are mainly representatives of Russian speakers in east Ukraine and the financial and industrial conglomerates there.

Therefore, he has always been an active advocate of a special relationship with Russia. He has called for giving the Russian language a special status in Ukraine, while strengthening its economic and political cooperation with Russia within the framework of the CIS.

We can foresee that, after Yanukovych straightens out the domestic political situation, he may well resume bilateral political and economic relations with Russia. But to what extent he can strengthen overall relations with Russia remains to be seen.

Yanukovych will also maintain Kiev's cooperation with the United States and the EU. And although he is not favored by either, he will not be completely excluded either. After all, he has a longstanding reputation as a conservative and realistic politician.

In the 2004 presidential election, his pro-Moscow attitude made a clear impression on the rest of the world. But a careful analysis of his political team and financial interests that have backed him indicates that his political survival depends strongly on the United States and the EU.

As Ukraine integrates into the global economy, Russia's stake in its foreign economic ties has faltered, dropping from 45 percent in the early days after its independence to about 25 percent today.

Beyond that, Ukraine's export markets have spread worldwide. The EU has also gone on to displace Russia as Ukraine's biggest economic partner. We thus have good reasons to believe that Ukraine will be likely to maintain its cooperative relations with the EU and NATO.

Nonetheless, while it has passed the lowest point of the financial crisis, the country still has a long way to go before it emerges from the turmoil. Maintaining relations with the West is the key for Ukraine to overcome the crisis, while revitalizing its moribund economy.

It will be up to Kiev's policymakers to decide upon whether Ukraine can continue its cooperation with the IMF, whether Ukrainian companies can export their products to EU and U.S. markets, and whether the country can secure investment and technology from the EU and the United States.

And at last, Kiev will need—and seek—to determine whether the pro-Western political forces in Ukraine can be united.

Any retreat of Yanukovych from European and NATO integration will likely lead to serious sanctions—and even full abandonment—by the West. It is thus highly likely that the existing cooperation will carry on.

There is already tangible evidence of this. For instance, Yanukovych chose to visit the EU headquarters in Brussels, instead of Moscow, on his first state visit.

In addition, Iryna Akimova, Yanukovych's First Deputy Chief of Staff, declared that Ukraine would not join the Russian-dominated customs union, as that would go against its free trade commitments to the EU.

This is proof that although Yanukovych will not adopt a one-sided diplomatic policy, his policy will very likely be skewed in favor of the EU.

The author is deputy director of the Division of Ukrainian Studies of the Institute of East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences