The other problem is strategic. Whether U.S. politicians sincerely like China or not, they must admit that how to deal with the relationship with China, an emerging country that is quite different from previous powers like the Soviet Union, Japan and Europe, now is a priority in Washington's foreign policy. Can the two countries overcome their strategic conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region and establish a new type of strategic relationship? This is a common task for the two major countries, and it is a much more important issue than their trade problems.

Washington will boost its Asia-Pacific strategic adjustment, a fact that will not change in accordance with Beijing's will. But China still hopes the Obama administration sticks to the right focus. Any policy leading to a face-to-face collision at sea between China and the United States is a policy guiding the United States to a strategic failure. Unfortunately, such a risk has grown during the past two years. Most importantly and imminently, the U.S. side should now carry out in-depth communication with China on maritime issues in East Asia and Southeast Asia, so as to avoid fomenting mutual dissatisfaction and suspicion. They also need to strengthen communication and coordination on developments in the Middle East and Iran to preserve cooperation and prevent conflicts of interests.

Staying calm

China needs to stay calm when facing the U.S. strategic adjustment of Asia-Pacific policies. It doesn't need to care about U.S. leaders' worry and anxiety about China's rapid catch-up, because such a mentality is normal for a country that has been the only dominant power in the world for decades. Like it or not, the United States has marked China as its No. 1 competitor. So being a qualified competitor by doing all its business well is a realistic choice for China. U.S. influence is important, but only China's own deeds can decide its future.

China can take comfort in the fact that there are forces resisting a vicious strategy against China in the United States. During the presidential campaign, many U.S. scholars, journalists, think tanks, business organizations and former senior officials publicly criticized candidates of the two major parties for their attempts to gain support by China-bashing. They condemned election campaign advisers who had only a superficial knowledge of Sino-U.S. relations, especially those working for Republican candidates. They worried that if those advisers get a big say in policymaking, American interests will be seriously hurt. This self-cleansing phenomenon is very rare in U.S. presidential elections, showing that there are many clear heads in the United States who oppose the idea of making China an enemy.

What China should worry about is the uncoordinated stance on China among U.S. policymakers, which could destabilize Washington's China policy and convey confusing messages. This could lead to increasing difficulties in rationally handling conflicts between them and add more risks to Sino-U.S. relations.

Generally speaking, the Sino-U.S. relationship continued developing during Obama's first term. However, the Obama administration did something hurting China's interests, like approving huge weapon sales to Taiwan, meeting the Dalai Lama and intervening in China's territorial disputes with its neighbors in the South China Sea.

Obama's reelection will help push forward the active elements of their bilateral relationship, such as adjusting and deepening their strategic dialogues. The following four years will be a crucial period for both China and the United States: They will use this period to realize their respective economic and social development goals as well as to adapt to each other in changed circumstances. Both sides should feel the urge to forge a stable and predictable bilateral relationship instead of one that harbors suspicion.

The New York Times published an article on November 23, 2011, saying that the United States and China should get rid of the curse of Thucydides' trap, in which the ancient Greek historian believes war is inevitable between an existing power and an emerging power. It called for the two sides to prevent a lose-lose result that would be caused by confrontation. But the United States is not Sparta and China is not ancient Athens. The pattern of 2,500 years ago cannot be simply duplicated in today's world. The two countries' respective paths and the direction of their bilateral relationship are possibly going to determine the development of international situations in the coming four years. That's also why they have the obligation to set up a new type of relationship.

The author is an op-ed contributor to Beijing Review

Email us at: yanwei@bjreview.com