U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken delivered a speech on U.S. policy toward China on May 26. In an interview with Beijing Review reporter Tao Zihui, British political and international relations analyst Tom Fowdy commented on the speech’s potential impacts. Edited excerpts of his views follow:   

Beijing Review: What signal does U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s speech send? Does “competition” remain the crux of the China-U.S. relationship? 

Tom Fowdy: Blinken, in coordination with Biden’s recent summits, is looking to reset the focus of U.S. foreign policy back to China and away from Russia. Although he speaks of a “rules-based order” there should be little doubt that, in practice, the U.S. seeks to try and contain the rise of China and in doing so is formulating Cold War-like divisions in Asia, but he may be moderating his rhetoric here in a bid to try and reassure allies. The administration has consistently demonstrated bad faith when it comes to matters of cooperating or seeking engagement with Beijing. 

Do Blinken’s three main points--“invest, align, compete”--also reflect the priorities of the U.S. policy? 

American foreign policy right now seeks to reassert its hegemonic position over what it styles the “Indo-Pacific.” Because of the impact of America First-leaning domestic policies, the “invest” element of this statement is hollow as the U.S. only seeks to make demands of other countries, offering little in return. In many economic areas, the U.S. cannot compete with China, which subsequently results in bad faith tactics to try and undermine Beijing instead. In terms of “align,” the U.S. seeks to reinforce its strategic hold over its allies in the view of opposing China and is forcing countries to take sides accordingly. 

Is the U.S. trying to mobilize allies in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe to compete with China? 

The U.S. is attempting to mobilize allies in Asia against China. It is doing so through a strategy of “minilateralism” which refers to the creation of small groups and blocs for several strategic ends that target China whilst also excluding it. This includes the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (commonly referred to as the Quad), AUKUS, and the newly announced Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). This strategy is geared toward creating a regional order which favors the U.S. and excludes China. The U.S. has, in tandem, sought to recruit European allies into its fight against Beijing, something the Russia-Ukraine war has ultimately facilitated. 

How do you think China should respond to the situation? 

China should respond to the situation with moderation and caution, as opposed to escalating tensions with the U.S. China has many advantages on its side which expose the lack of reality and pragmatism based on U.S. policies designed to confront it. For example, the IPEF is ultimately unsubstantial because China is the commercial and economic center of Asia, not the U.S. In this case, China should respond through careful diplomacy which focuses on continuing to integrate itself with other regional countries, for example, by joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). It should be ready to defend its interests but should avoid creating situations that lend legitimacy to U.S. containment policies and force countries to take sides. Openness, multilateralism and globalization favor China, but they do not favor the U.S., which is striving to reverse these processes in turn. 

Copyedited by Elsbeth van Paridon  

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