U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken delivered a much-anticipated speech at George Washington University on May 26. "Much-anticipated" because what he said would confirm whether the Biden administration was doubling down on critical policies about China or if it was ready to open the door to China being a meaningful partner in addressing the complex challenges facing the global community.

It did not take long to determine the answer: The White House remains resolute in its belief that China is the big bad bully on the international stage. Blinken spoke glowingly about the world order created—and hegemonically controlled—by the U.S. He then added, "China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to do it. Beijing's vision would move us away from the universal values that have sustained so much of the world's progress over the past 75 years."

Designed to deceive? 

The "universal values" Blinken had in mind are obvious, and they need not be repeated here. But what about the wars in which the U.S. has engaged that have furthered the destruction of countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan? What should the world conclude when it thinks about the many examples of the U.S. undermining political figures in Latin America and elsewhere as Washington sought to install friendly leaders in place? How do endemic poverty and racism in the U.S. square with exceptionalism? Blinken did say the U.S. was "not perfect," but glossing over domestic and international embarrassments is not sufficient when the claim is that one country leads by example when it comes to the promotion of "universal values." 

Blinken also regurgitated the same set of talking points consistent with the elitist American rhetoric about China: "mass surveillance," "undermining peace and security," "harming workers and companies," and the list goes on. The message was clear: China cannot be trusted, and it ought not to be admired.

Three key terms were central to Blinken's speech: invest, align, compete. And all were framed as necessary because the U.S. today faces an existential threat to its global dominance by a country that believes the 21st century need not be automatically governed by standards of the 20th century.

The Belt and Road Initiative is just one example. China has built partnerships with close to 150 countries across all parts of the world except—you guessed it—North America. These agreements are designed to improve infrastructure, aid economic growth, and facilitate bilateral and multilateral trade, while not demanding any nation adopt a specific economic or political system as a means to secure participation. Governments can adhere to the systems befitting their national conditions and people, instead of facing pressure to accept what was previously called "the Washington Consensus." That consensus placed the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the U.S. Government in positions of power; governments that refused to adhere to free markets, democratic elections and human rights—all defined by Western constructs—too often were left empty-handed. Chinese leaders argue that the Belt and Road Initiative is based on mutual respect as each participating country sees benefits from engaging with the initiative. Ask a Western leader for a description and prepare to be told deceit is at the project's core.

Questioning ambition 

In late May, the U.S. unveiled what it believes is a better concept—the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which President Biden touted during his recent trip to Asia. During his remarks at George Washington University, Blinken said the IPEF "renews American economic leadership but adapts it to the 21st century by addressing cutting-edge issues like the digital economy, supply chains, clean energy, infrastructure and corruption."

Notice the key phrase: "renews American economic leadership." Are we not left to wonder if the IPEF, which thus far has about one dozen participating nations, is nothing more than a quick paint job on an otherwise old house? Critics abound here, there and everywhere. Foreign Policy noted that "Asian governments are not wrong to have mixed feelings about the IPEF. U.S. trade officials plan to seek higher labor and environmental performances from negotiating partners, but they have also indicated they are not prepared to offer access to the U.S. market." Bloomberg added that members of Congress have "criticized the IPEF as lacking substance, with senators from both parties blasting Biden's trade agenda at a March hearing and grilling U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai over a shortage of ambition to negotiate new agreements."

"A shortage of ambition" is apparent in the current White House. The president's low-key personality too often resembles that of a man who lacks vision and ideas. Americans are paying attention, especially because inflation continues to rise while essential items, including quite recently baby formula, are in short supply. Right now, Republicans are positioned to assume control of the Senate, and perhaps the House of Representatives, following November's midterm elections. If that happens, anything the president would propose during the final two years of his term would face certain rejection.

What should we make of the message that China cannot be a legitimate player in solving deeply rooted global challenges? Is the U.S. seeking to mobilize its allies throughout Europe and Asia to confront China? Of course it is. The IPEF is just one example here. Blinken did admit that the U.S. and China have overlapping areas of interest in which they share common ground. But think of it this way: If I slap you in the face two times for every one time that I compliment you, which are you more likely to remember? And is my repeated slapping or my occasional praising the action that better reflects what I think of you?

A final question: How should China respond to all of this? Perhaps with a shrug. Blinken offered nothing in his address to indicate the U.S. truly wants to be China's international partner in addressing pandemic prevention, containing climate change, reducing fears of military conflict and more. Rather, his remarks served as a reminder that the U.S. insists it ought to be respected around the world—despite the strings it attaches to its ideology and refuses to see—as it offers faint praise to real and imaginary rivals.

The author is an associate professor with the School of Informatics, Humanities and Social Sciences at Robert Morris University in the U.S. 

Copyedited by Elsbeth van Paridon 

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