Mendis narrates China's "string of pearls" strategy as a geoeconomic plan—not as a gloomy geopolitical axiom whereas when countries become more powerful, they will seek to expand their sphere of influence. This echoes tensions between the United States and Japan when America gained its first Pacific base in 1898. Japan had until then considered the Pacific as their private preserve. It got the American message when President Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919) later dispatched his Great White Fleet around the world, making a visit to Tokyo Bay in 1908.

It was American capabilities that signaled the United States was not only a Pacific, but also a world power. Today, despite its pronouncements of a "peaceful rise," China is continuing with its military developments. The general perception is that no clear affirmation exists of China's long-term intention.

China at a crossroads

In a Chinese historical tale—reflecting the folklore of George Washington (1732-99) and the cherry tree—there is a story of patience and long view. King Goujian (about 520-465 B.C.) of the Yue State (now east China's Zhejiang Province) was taken prisoner in 492 B.C. after a battle with King Fuchai (?-473 B.C.), his neighbor to the north. Goujian was put to work in a prison, where he was so dignified in his captivity that Fuchai allowed him to return home after a few years. But, Goujian never forgot his humiliation as he underwent hardship by sleeping on brushwood and tasting gall bladders to strengthen his determination to revenge, while appearing loyal to Fuchai. Upon release, Goujian was able to raise an army and lead another war against Fuchai, who committed suicide after an unsuccessful settlement for a cessation of hostilities.

The obvious interpretation to this narrative is biding one's time to avenge a past defeat, and putting one's enemies to the sword. Another, according to Professor Paul Cohen of the Fairbank Center at Harvard University (in The Economist), is that success only comes with dedication, sacrifice, and perseverance—a view held by the Chinese. The story is one of self-improvement, not revenge but patience—a long view.

The questions of our times are: Will Beijing achieve its might, only to return to avenge past transgressions? Or will China's "peaceful rise" create a more stable and prosperous region? Mendis posits the two nations "need to foster greater patience and understanding of each other by reflecting more on history and less on rhetoric." He maintains that China need not to worry about being encircled by the United States and its allies. Nor does it need to worry about the recent "Asia pivot strategy in the Pacific and Indian Oceans" because "mutual prosperity and social stability" rely on the interdependence of the two economies. Mendis is optimistic if prudent leadership continues in Beijing and Washington.

In his book, On China, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger also agrees "the crucial competition between the United States and China is more likely to be economic and social than military." Hopefully, this is the case for the two superpowers.

Mendis provides a carefully researched narrative with equanimity on the historical context of the Sino-American relationship. Noting parallels and intersections between the two societies, readers will gain a deeper appreciation for issues critical to the Pacific region and global security.

In short, Mendis offers a modus vivendi to foster a new type of power relationship. Within this framework, one must continue to build respect, trust, and confidence, lest present circumstances reach a regrettable end. Policymakers would do well to reach into the depths of these thoughts for deeper understanding and constructive engagement.

The writer is a defense analyst in the United States

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