A state visit is the highest-level form of bilateral diplomacy between countries. On the afternoon of September 23, local time, Chinese President Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan arrived in Washington, D.C. The United States received them with unusually high-level diplomatic honors, including a 21-gun salute and a military flyover, with President Donald Trump and First Lady Melania Trump personally on hand to welcome them.

Under longstanding U.S. diplomatic protocol, foreign heads of state arriving at Joint Base Andrews are typically received by the vice president or secretary of state, with the president hosting a formal welcome ceremony later on the South Lawn of the White House. An American president personally going to the tarmac at Andrews to receive a foreign leader is highly unusual. The last such occasion dated back to 1962, when President John F. Kennedy welcomed British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan.

The agenda 

The visit was the second meeting between Xi and Trump in six months. Ahead of the summit, American media and China watchers described the expected agenda as the “three Ts, plus two:” trade, technology and Taiwan, along with AI governance and regional flashpoints. On trade, officials had discussed a reciprocal cut of tariffs on about $30 billion in non-critical goods on each side. On technology, both governments had indicated plans to establish an AI dialogue mechanism. On Taiwan, Trump had yet to approve a proposed arms package of roughly $14 billion that had already cleared Congress. China had consistently urged the U.S. to abide by the one-China principle and the three China-U.S. joint communiqués, honor its commitment not to support “Taiwan independence” and firmly curb separatist activities seeking “Taiwan independence.” Fentanyl precursors and rare-earth supply-chain cooperation were also among the issues under discussion.

Scott Kennedy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies offered a view representative of much of the debate in Washington ahead of the visit. His case was that years of unilateral American pressure had not extracted the concessions Washington expected, while China’s export engine remained strong. At the same time, Trump was managing the situation in the Middle East, domestic prices and the midterm elections. Julian Gewirtz, a former senior China policy official in the Joe Biden administration, made another argument widely cited in the U.S. media: American leaders once drove the relationship, but the balance of power and the dynamics of the relationship had changed substantially.

In my view, the summit needed to accomplish two things at once. First, the two sides needed a trade solution that could prevent another round of disruption to global supply chains. Second, they needed concrete, measurable steps to strengthen people-to-people exchange: more direct flights, visa procedures that do not automatically treat every undergraduate in science and engineering as a target for heightened scrutiny, and research and academic exchanges measured in months rather than week-long tours. The American side, in particular, should respond positively by ending the politicization of ordinary people-to-people exchange.

About people  

China has long attached great importance to people-to-people ties. Chinese President Xi Jinping announced during a welcome ceremony at the White House on September 24 that China will roll out an initiative to host 100,000 young Americans for exchange programs and academic study within the next five‑year period.

Back in November 2023 at the San Francisco gathering, President Xi put forward a proposal to bring 50,000 young Americans to China for exchanges and study over five years. That milestone has been fulfilled ahead of schedule this year.

China has consistently emphasized that the story of China-U.S. friendship is written by the people and that the future of the relationship will be created by the young.

Measures such as direct flights, easier visa procedures and cross-border youth exchanges may look small, but they can quietly reshape how people see one another. An American student who has actually lived and studied in China is harder to sell a demonized picture of the country. Firsthand experience raises the cost of sustaining a simplistic “China threat” narrative. China’s 240-hour visa-free transit policy, available to eligible travelers including Americans in genuine transit, is another seemingly small measure that can accumulate lasting benefits for mutual understanding between the two societies.

Culture is already doing the work a communiqué cannot. International China-made box office smash hit Ne Zha 2 played in North American theaters, while Zootopia 2 drew large audiences and strong box-office returns in China. The Philadelphia Orchestra resumed touring China. American sports and cultural figures such as Kyrie Irving traveled to China for exchanges. American rapper J. Cole experienced Chinese cities and transportation firsthand and spoke positively about what he saw. These encounters cut through stereotypes through lived experience and form some of the most tangible connections capable of easing antagonism between the two societies.

The absence of strong people-to-people ties is one of the greatest hidden risks in relations between major powers. Once channels of communication between ordinary people weaken, small disagreements in public opinion and isolated incidents can be magnified step by step, eventually contributing to tighter policies, stalled exchanges and frozen cooperation. The greater danger comes when public perceptions in both countries are shaped for too long by a small number of voices that amplify confrontation and sell anxiety. The relationship can then become trapped in a cycle in which misunderstanding produces suspicion and suspicion produces still more misunderstanding.

People-to-people exchange does not settle the Taiwan question or rare earths. But it does things a four-hour meeting cannot. It creates memory that outlasts a tariff schedule. It creates channels that can still move when military talks freeze and investment screening tightens. Flight frequencies, visa waits and whether a 22-year-old can spend a semester abroad may seem peripheral to high diplomacy. Over time, they help determine whether the two societies understand one another through direct experience or through narratives constructed by others.

The B-2 passed overhead. The anthems were played. The motorcades eventually left. And the relationship returned to what it is: Two large countries that can still, if they choose, hit each other’s markets, fleets and chip lines; that trust each other only in fragments; and that still send their children across the ocean—because the alternative is to know each other only through the people paid to sell fear and mistrust.

The author observes issues related to China-U.S. political narratives. He is also active in CODEPINK’s China Is Not Our Enemy campaign 

Copyedited Elsbeth van Paridon 

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